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This paper identifies legislative changes in tax havens resulting from pressure from rich countries exercised through the OECD. It focuses on the specific situation of the Netherlands Antilles. The paper analyzes the response given by the Netherlands Antilles to the international community through the modification of its tax agreement with the mother country in Europe and considers whether that is a solution for adoption by other tax havens. The paper then argues that this model is not appropriate for use in a small economy that cannot rely on a supportive mother country or on tourism as an alternative resource. The paper concludes that the legal status of small island states could be reconsidered in public international law and proposes that rich countries adopt a balanced approach when considering harmful tax competition.

I. Introduction

Any attempt to comment on tax haven legislation exposes the writer to two dangers:

- The first is the risk of offending those who defend the status quo of tax havens, on the basis that tax competition is good because low tax rates attract corporations and are a source of income for small economies.
- The second is the risk of offending those who criticize the status quo on the basis that it is not tax competition, but rather tax harmonization that is desirable, because competitive practices in taxation can distort the location of capital and services in a manner detrimental to the international community as a whole.¹

This paper, therefore, advocates a balanced approach to the question of tax havens. It concludes that one must simply rethink the legal status of tax havens within the international community. The example of recent changes that occurred in the Netherlands Antilles is the basis for reflection. Along with tourism, taxation is the mainstay of that small economy.² The Netherlands Antilles is often seen as a leading financial center offering an attractive regime with low tax rates. Many international financial firms have a presence in the Netherlands Antilles because, until recently, tax rates ranged between 2.4 percent and 9.66 percent depending on the type of income a company generated.³ Those tax rates made the Netherlands Antilles seem a veritable tax “heaven.”⁴

²Followed by petroleum refining and shipping. Almost all consumer and capital goods are imported principally from Venezuela, the United States, and Mexico, because poor soils and inadequate water supply (except for Aruba) hamper the development of agriculture.
³When deriving their net income out of interest, royalty, dividend, trading, management and consultancy, offshore (Footnote continued on next page.)
Should investing in a tax haven be viewed as tax evasion or tax avoidance?

Is the traditional tax evasion/tax avoidance distinction still relevant for our subject? In other words, should investing in a tax haven be viewed as tax evasion or tax avoidance? Authors usually distinguish tax evasion, which is illegal, from tax avoidance, which is legal. When an individual’s earnings reach the minimum level for income tax and social security contributions, he or she can decide to stop working for the rest of the tax year (perfectly legal) or continue to work for unreported cash payment (not legal). But nowadays tax avoidance itself sometimes becomes illegal, because most high-tax countries have antiavoidance laws, which prevent both companies and individuals from using tax havens to escape their national tax obligations. That was the case, for instance, for the French “exit tax” on unrealized capital gains on stock in companies in which an individual has substantial holdings as soon as they had left France. The aim of that domestic legislation is to prevent people from benefiting from tax competition seen as harmful to the community as a whole.

In addition to those internal measures taken by high-tax countries, multilateral organizations, like the European Union or the OECD, use political pressure and threats of economic reprisals to eliminate harmful tax competition. Even the World Trade Organization has an interest in promoting better trade-related tax legislation. That is exemplified by the recent challenge before the WTO Appellate Body of the U.S. foreign sales corporation tax regime.

References

Why, then, does the Netherlands Antilles offer a good example of a coherent response to international community pressure directed at eliminating harmful tax competition? The Netherlands Antilles’ response took the form of a move from their favorable international tax regime toward a more internationally accepted tax scheme for foreign investors. But it also preserved the interests of the local economy by including a transitional period of approximately 20 years. However, it is uncertain that this example can be followed everywhere; after all, it is not easy for a small country economy, with few resources other than offshore financial services, to switch to other sources of income just to please other (richer) countries. More fundamentally, the sovereign legal status of small independent states within the international community may have to be reconsidered.

This paper first identifies the pressures for tax changes exercised by rich countries, focusing on the specific situation the Netherlands Antilles was facing in the world community. Then it analyzes whether the response given by the Netherlands Antilles through, for instance, the modification of its tax agreement with the mother country in Europe is a solution for adoption by all other tax havens.

II. The Netherlands Antilles and the World Community

The Kingdom of the Netherlands encompasses the Netherlands, the Netherlands Antilles, and Aruba. The Netherlands (also known as Holland, after two of its larger provinces) is the part of the kingdom situated in Europe. The Netherlands Antilles comprises two island groups in the Caribbean Sea. One group, including Curacao and Bonaire, lies north of Venezuela, while the other group, comprising St. Maarten, Saba, and St. Eustatius, lies east of the Virgin Islands and north of Martinique. Of those five islands, Curacao is the largest, containing 75 percent of the islands’ approximately 200,000 inhabitants. Aruba originally formed part of the Netherlands Antilles, but acquired a separate status in 1986.

Europe, see Otmar Thömmes, “CFC Legislation and EC Law,” Intertax 2003, vol. 31, no. 5, p. 188.

10Recently those tax rates have been raised to a standard 34.5 percent, so it may be asked whether the Netherlands Antilles is still the tax “heaven” it once was.

11Supra note 8.

12Statut voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, 1954 Staatsblad 503, as amended.

13Another reason for leaving Aruba aside in this paper is that its offshore industry is much less important than that of Curacao.

For the relationship between the motherland and its dependent territories, the situation is as follows. In theory, the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba are autonomous in the management of their affairs, because the mother country in Europe is responsible only for foreign affairs, defense, and external economic relations. In practice, however, the Netherlands Antilles, more than Aruba, is very dependent on the European part of the kingdom.

Interest in tax havens is not new, but it is increasing. The international community is now accusing tax havens of financing terrorism. And September 11 is only one of the factors behind that increase. Two interconnected factors are as important as the financing of international terrorism — money laundering and harmful tax competition. Harmful tax competition has been the subject of in-depth investigation by various international bodies. In all those investigations the Netherlands Antilles have been included.

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That is because tax regimes like that of the Netherlands Antilles have led to dramatic capital inflows to offshore centers. However, there has

14See C. Kortmann and P. Bovend’Eert, Dutch Constitutional Law, Kluwer Law International, 2000, p. 37: the autonomy and equivalent status of those overseas territories vis-à-vis the state in Europe is guaranteed by a charter, which is the basis for that federation sui generis.

15Id., p. 40.


18That rate of increase is well in excess of the growth of total outbound foreign direct investment. Foreign direct investment in those regions increased more than five-fold over the period 1985-1994, to more than US $200 billion; see OECD, Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue, 1998, p. 80. In fact, for every percentage point increase in the

(Footnote continued on next page.)
recently been a slowdown, at least within the Car-
ibbean jurisdictions. The offshore sector’s contribu-
tion, which was 20 percent of the gross domestic product in 1985, fell to 8 percent in 2000.\(^{19}\) Financial services in most Caribbean jurisdictions have lost significant business in their sector. As a result, the Netherlands Antilles has also experienced a sharp decline in growth since the middle of the last de-
cade.\(^{20}\) The characterization of the Netherlands Antilles as a tax haven, which makes the taxpayer fall from “heaven” (2.4 percent tax rate) to what will be shown to be “hell” (34.5 percent tax rate), results from the OECD’s conquest of paradise through eco-
nomic reprisals.

### A. From Heaven to Hell: The Netherlands Antilles Characterization as a ‘Tax Haven’

Although the following organizations are not the only international bodies pressuring for changes in taxation,\(^{21}\) the main reason for that economic recession is the “blacklisting” of those jurisdictions by the OECD, the European Union, and the Financial Stability Forum (FSF).\(^{22}\) Therefore, three bodies, the FSF, the European Union, and the OECD, were exerting pressure for changes. Let us look at the FSF findings first.

1. The Financial Stability Forum

The FSF,\(^{23}\) which brings together senior representa-
tives of national financial authorities and interna-
tional financial institutions, issued a report in April 2000.\(^ {24}\) It characterized the Netherlands Antilles as being among the most dubious of tax havens, along with, for instance, Aruba, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Liechtenstein, Mauritius, Nauru, Seychelles, and Vanuatu.\(^ {25}\) In September 2003 in Paris, the 10th meeting of the FSF suggested that the monitoring of the offshore financial centers should be an integral part of the IMF’s financial sector surveillance work,\(^ {26}\) a suggestion repeated a few days later in Dubai.\(^ {27}\) The IMF has already published an assessment in 2002 of the offshore financial situation in Aruba.\(^ {28}\) The assessment in the Netherlands Antilles was published in February 2004.\(^ {29}\)

2. The EU ‘Code of Conduct’

In much the same way, the European Union is tackling harmful tax competition among its member states. In 1997, the European Council agreed on a common political approach, with a package of tax measures that included a code of conduct designed

(See “Les pays riches promettent de tirer ensemble la crois-
sance mondiale,” La Nouvelle République, no. 1042, Feb. 25, 1999, available at http://www.africaonline.co.za/AfricaOnline/infos/nourep/1042int1.html.) See also FSF, Who We Are, 2003, available at http://www.fsforum.org/about/who_we_are.html. But the FSF consists only of G7 governments, the IMF, the Bank for International Settlements, the OECD, and related international bodies. (See Doggart, Tax Havens and Their Uses, p. 152.)


\(^{27}\)FSF, Statement by Roger W. Ferguson Jr., chair of the Financial Stability Forum, International Monetary and Fi-

\(^{28}\)IMF, Monetary and Exchange Affairs Department, Jan Willem van der Vossen, Ross Delston, Gabriella Ferencz, and Steve Butterworth, Aruba — Offshore Financial Center As-
essment, 2002, vols. I and II. In 1995, a consulting firm attempted to estimate the economic importance of the off-
shore sector for Aruba, but due to lack of data, it did not come to an authoritative estimate. The economic importance of the approximately 5,000 offshore entities cannot be established reliably, as they do not prepare or publish financial state-
ments or information on ownership and activities.


(Footnote continued in next column.)
to eliminate harmful tax competition in the business taxation area. According to the proposed timetable, phasing out harmful tax measures will be completed by December 31, 2005.

Apart from setting a date for the termination of the schemes, the code of conduct requests member states with dependent and associated territories, such as the Kingdom of the Netherlands, to ensure that harmful business taxation measures are suppressed in those territories. Indeed, a working group on harmful tax competition, known as the Primarolo group, identified the Kingdom of the Netherlands as a leader in Europe, with 10 harmful tax measures.

The tax package was finally agreed on in Luxembourg by the EU Council of Economic and Finance Ministers on June 3, 2003. As it stands, that consists of three measures: the code of conduct, a directive on the taxation of savings income, and a directive on the taxation of interest and royalty payments between associated companies. As “soft law,” the code of conduct is only a political commitment agreed on by the member states.


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B. The OECD Conquest of Paradise: The Threat of Economic Repraisals

Every tax lawyer is aware of OECD work in the field of tax treaties. The OECD now also provides a framework in which countries can work to eliminate not tax competition as such, but only “harmful” tax competition. Tax competition is not necessarily bad. That is the view of the United States, a major player. For instance, former U.S. Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill stated in May 2001 that “the U.S. does not support efforts to dictate to any country what its own tax rates or tax system should be, and will not participate in any initiative to harmonize world tax systems.” But the question now is — to what extent is that competition permissible? It seems that the OECD members are open to competition as long as it is transparent and nondiscriminatory. The OECD position expressed in a report issued in 1998 is presented below, before dealing with the Netherlands Antilles response to that OECD appraisal.

1. The 1998 Report

In 1998, the OECD established an international framework to counter the spread of harmful tax competition by adopting a report (the 1998 report). It defines the factors to be used in identifying harmful tax practices. The key features of harmful preferential tax regimes are: (1) no or low effective tax rates; (2) lack of transparency; (3) lack of effective exchange of information; and (4) “ring-fencing” of regimes. Ring-fencing refers to when preferential tax regimes are insulated from the domestic markets of the country providing the regime, for example, by excluding resident taxpayers from taking advantage of its benefits, or prohibiting enterprises that benefit from the preferential regime from operating in the domestic market. The very fact that a country feels the need to protect its own economy from the regime by ring-fencing is a strong indication that the regime has the potential to create harmful effects.

The Ministerial Council of the OECD instructed its Committee on Fiscal Affairs to produce, from the number of jurisdictions meeting the tax haven criteria, a list of those that were uncooperative, to be completed by July 31, 2001. In 2000, the OECD published a preliminary list of the jurisdictions that were found to meet the tax haven criteria of the 1998 report. Cited among those jurisdictions are Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles. What risks did the Netherlands Antilles face if it had maintained its existing old tax regime?

If it had, the OECD would allow its members to take defensive measures either under domestic legislation or under tax treaties, such as, for instance, disallowing tax deductions, tax exemptions, tax

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37For an interesting argument using art. 96 of the EC Treaty as a legal basis to attack tax measures that have been identified as harmful under the code of conduct, see Francesco Nanetti and Giovanni Mameli, “The Creeping Normative Role of the EC Commission in the Twin-Track Struggle Against State Aids and Harmful Tax Competition,” EC Tax Review 2002, no. 4, p. 185, at 189; Jan de Goede, “European Integration and Tax Law,” European Taxation 2003, vol. 43, no. 6, p. 206; and Meussen, The EU Fight Against Harmful Tax Competition: Developments in Light of the Enlargement of the EU With 10 Candidate Member States, p. 5.


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42Id. at 26. However, the ring-fencing criteria has been dropped, because what is most important for the OECD is transparency and the exchange of information.

43Id. at 27. In the Netherlands Antilles, the tax revenue for 2002 on income and profits is 11.1 percent of the GDP, of which 2.5 percent is offshore. (See IMF, Country Report no. 03/160, p. 29.)


45The critical remarks that were made to the Netherlands Antilles tax laws can be summarized as follows: there were no legal mechanisms that allow tax information to be exchanged with other tax authorities upon request; beneficial ownership information was not available to the public; and there were restrictions on the ability of the Netherlands Antilles entities to do business on the preferential tax terms in the Netherlands Antilles. See OECD, 2000 Report: Towards Global Tax Co-operation: Progress in Identifying and Eliminating Harmful Tax Practices, p. 17.
credits, or making other allowances related to transactions with uncooperative tax havens. The economic reprisals could also have taken the form of a "transactional" charge. Those levies would have been imposed on particular transactions involving uncooperative tax havens. Of course, the legality of those defensive measures, which fall within the scope of the General Agreement on Trade in Services, has been questioned in light of public international economic law. And the OECD timetable has also been recently undermined by the European Union by permitting some of its own members (who are also OECD members) to avoid tax information exchange until 2010 at the earliest. But the Netherlands Antilles took that threat seriously.

2. The Netherlands Antilles’ Response

Indeed, it is true that if the Netherlands Antilles did not make a commitment to eliminate harmful tax practices by July 31, 2001, it would have been automatically included in the list of uncooperative tax havens, subject to possible economic reprisals and suffering a major loss of confidence on the part of its international clients. The Netherlands Antilles minister of finance wrote a letter to the OECD secretary general on behalf of the government of the Netherlands Antilles, committing his country to eliminating tax practices determined to be harmful by changing its tax framework. To achieve that, it also needed to amend its relationship with the mother country in Europe.

III. The Netherlands Antilles and the Kingdom

Under its commitment to the OECD, the Netherlands Antilles has taken several measures. This paper describes only the major tax measures, bearing in mind how the Netherlands Antilles fits into the international tax system.

In the postwar years, the advantages of important tax treaties between the Netherlands and the United States and the United Kingdom were extended to include the Netherlands Antilles. Currently, however, the Netherlands Antilles has a tax treaty only with the Netherlands, known as the tax arrangement for the Kingdom (TAK), and with Norway. It terminated all the other tax treaties, because some third-country residents had abused them to reduce withholding taxes on investments in OECD countries. By contrast, the mother country

Footnote continued on next page.)
in Europe has, of course, concluded many tax treaties, but the Netherlands Antilles is excluded from their scope, for instance, in the France-Netherlands and the Netherlands-U.S. tax treaties. However, the United States has recently entered into an exchange of information agreement with the Netherlands for the Netherlands Antilles, which shows that new treaties with important trading partners are now under consideration. The Netherlands Antilles is negotiating tax treaties with the United States, Venezuela, Spain, and a few other countries.

A. The New Fiscal Framework

Given the New Fiscal Framework (NFF) adopted by the Netherlands Antilles, it might well appear to the observer that paradise is lost. However, the “exception clause” creating a transitional period until 2019 seems to have given paradise a reprieve.

1. The OECD Friendly Measures: Paradise Lost?

At the end of 2001, the Netherlands Antilles’ parliament adopted two important pieces of legislation — the New Fiscal Framework and the law ratifying the amendments to the TAK. The NFF and the TAK both entered into force on January 1, 2002. It ended the period of uncertainty for clients resulting from international pressure, bearing in mind that clients are indeed ready to pay a little bit more for any gain in certainty and predictability.

The NFF comprises three laws. The most important is the law on corporate income tax. The highlights of the NFF are the introduction of a uniform corporate tax regime with a standard profits tax rate of 34.5 percent and a broad participation exemption regime, which looks very much like the French participation exemption regime. The meaning of “uniform” corporate tax regime is that the NFF abolishes the previous distinction between offshore and onshore tax regimes, so that it could no longer be characterized as a ring-fencing regime.

The mother country in Europe has concluded many tax treaties, but the Netherlands Antilles is excluded from its scope.

To understand fully the amendments to the TAK and their impact, the previous situation must be explained. Before the amendments, withholding tax on dividends paid to corporate shareholders established in the Netherlands Antilles and holding at least 25 percent of the shares in the Dutch subsidiary paying the dividend could be reduced from 15 percent to 7.5 percent, or to 5 percent if the dividend recipient was subject to a profit tax rate of at least 5.5 percent. As the old profit tax rate in the Netherlands Antilles ranged between 2.4 percent and 7 percent, it could no longer be characterized as a ring-fencing regime.

58Under the participation exemption regime, gains or profits made from foreign participations are exempted for 95 percent. The remaining 5 percent is taxed according to the uniform charge of 34.5 percent (the effective charge therefore amounts to about 1.7 percent). The exemption is applicable if the taxpayer is a shareholder accounting for at least 5 percent of the paid-in capital or of the voting rights and if the possession of shares is less than 5 percent, then it may be regarded as a qualifying participation providing the cost price of the shares amount to more than ANG 1,000,000 (approximately €650,000): see PricewaterhouseCoopers, Update on Fiscal Developments and Possibilities in the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba, p. 6.
61See art. 11(3) of the TAK.
and 3 percent, that meant that the Dutch withholding tax on dividends was, in practice, reduced to 7.5 percent. Therefore, the total tax burden on those intercorporate dividends ranged between 9.7 percent and 10.3 percent, approximately.

The amendments of the dividend withholding tax article have the effect that dividends paid by a Dutch company to a Netherlands Antilles company are subject to Dutch dividend withholding tax at a rate of 8.3 percent, provided that at least 25 percent of the paid-in share capital (or voting rights) in the Dutch company are held by the Netherlands Antilles company. For conduit dividends flowing through the Dutch B.V., a further tax credit of approximately 3 percent may be available. If the 25 percent condition is not fulfilled, the Dutch dividend withholding tax rate increases to 15 percent.

To summarize, that amendment to the TAK, which applies only to dividends paid from the Netherlands to the Netherlands Antilles, provides that, in most cases, the effective tax burden will be lower than it was under the old arrangement. Tax is first levied in the Netherlands at source and the subsequent dividend is entirely exempted in the Netherlands Antilles. The entire amount withheld in the Netherlands is then paid back by the Dutch government to the Netherlands Antilles. However, the NFF does not entirely abolish the old tax provisions; the NFF succeeded in preserving its very competitive tax rate of 2.4 percent to 3 percent for existing companies, but only until 2019. This is known as the “exception clause” or the “transitional arrangement.”

2. A Transitional Period up to 2019: Paradise Gets a Reprieve

The transitional arrangement for offshore companies is of great practical interest. In the transitional period up to and including the year 2019, existing offshore companies will be granted the benefits of the old offshore regime, provided some requirements are met. That implies that the previous 2.4 percent to 3 percent tax rates, for those companies, are guaranteed up to and including the year 2019. Similarly, the new rules, which alone are designed to comply with international standards on transparency and ring-fencing, are inapplicable to taxpayers that have elected to remain subject to the old offshore regime under the transitional rules. The NFF has also created attractive new vehicles with the aim of securing financial business after the transitional period has expired. There has been no official reaction from the OECD. However, informal discussions with OECD senior representatives reveal that the OECD is happy with the changes that occurred in the Netherlands Antilles.

B. The Impact on the Local Economy

Because it is not expected that those tax changes will have an adverse impact on the local economy, one must ask whether that apparently successful change could be adopted elsewhere.

1. A Limited Impact

The OECD has not been totally indifferent to the impact of the changes it requests on the local economy. Although it is very clear that precise and reliable data on the economic impact are difficult to collect, it seems that offshore financial centers contribute some 8 percent to 10 percent of the GDP of tax havens. In the Netherlands Antilles, approximately 8,000 people work, directly or indirectly, in the offshore services industry. Because the population is less than 200,000 people, that accounts for around 10 percent of the active population. Surprisingly, the Netherlands Antilles parliamentary debates before the vote on the NFF do not reveal any in-depth discussion on the impact of tax measures.

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62Wet op de dividendbelasting 1965 (Dutch Dividend Withholding Tax Act), art. 11.
63PricewaterhouseCoopers, Update on Fiscal Developments and Possibilities in the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba, p. 15.
64Id. at 16.
65Id.
66The Guarantee Ordinance of 1993 provides a guarantee that the reduced taxation regime for the offshore sector will be applicable until the year 2019. IBFD, “General,” in Taxation & Investment in the Caribbean, para. 6.
69The exempted private limited companies (NA B.V.) can opt for a zero percent tax charge.
70Doggart, Tax Havens and Their Uses, p. 151. The OECD has held various meetings with various countries to achieve global cooperation. (For a description of those meetings, see Hishikawa, “The Death of Tax Havens?” p. 389.)
71IMF, Country Report no. 03/160.
73Politieke besluiteloosheid ondermijnt offshore-industrie (“Political Indecisiveness Undermines the Offshore Industry”), summary of a press conference in Willemstad, Curacao, available in the library of the IBFD, Amsterdam, and on file with author. In 1988, the percentage of the economically active population was 38.4 percent of the total population, that is, 72,906 persons.
Special Reports

on the local economy. On the contrary, it expresses the confidence of the Netherlands Antilles government that the adoption of internationally accepted standards will create more income to the economy. And that prediction happens to be sound; it seems that the offshore sector has already begun to recover following the implementation of the NFF.

2. The Specificity of the Netherlands Antilles Case

One should not forget that the Netherlands Antilles is in a special and privileged situation; if economic problems arose because of the NFF regime, it would be in a position to call for help from its mother country in Europe. That is probably one of the reasons why, after a referendum held in November 1993, the people of the Netherlands Antilles voted to continue their union with their mother country.

Informal discussions reveal that the OECD is happy with the changes in the Netherlands Antilles.

But what about the Republic of Nauru, the Pacific island nation that Australia is using as a holding station for unwanted asylum seekers? It could surely be said that Nauru's one and only onshore bank — the Bank of Nauru, which has effectively been insolvent for years — is not too concerned about the U.S. Treasury threats. Indeed, for a long time international banks have ceased to deal with it! Could we also say that OECD pressures over those small economies reflect "neo-colonial attitudes" by rich countries? One reason for that belief is that, because those countries are in economic decline, they will be unable to survive without the income generated from their offshore banking fees. As tourism is not a viable or sufficient option, the only alternative source of income is to develop another kind of service industry, such as the financial services industry.

It is true also that Nauru settled its famous 1989 case over phosphates with the Commonwealth of Australia and obtained a few dollars in damages. However, declining phosphate reserves are having an adverse effect on the local economy of Nauru. It is far from certain that Australia will be willing to help Nauru financially, if Nauru was moving toward more internationally accepted standards. Yet Nauru did recently decide to adopt those standards on December 3, 2003, hoping in the meantime that "OECD Member countries and other international organizations [will] take these adverse revenue effects [over the small economy of Nauru] into account in determining the development assistance they provide." One American author has written extensively about harmful tax competition, focusing on the Caribbean jurisdictions and the U.S. sanctions. It is not obvious that one should condemn those exhortations to Caribbean jurisdictions to "get up and stand up" against possible discriminatory sanctions. The view of this paper is that a fundamental reconsideration of the legal status of those tiny sovereign island states cannot be avoided.

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Footnotes:

74Statenstukken 1999-2000 no. 2313, memorie van toelichting (explanatory memorandum), para. 1, section 1.2.
75Id.
76IMF, Country Report no. 03/160 (nos. 2 and 7).
77Doggart, Tax Havens and Their Uses, p. 156.
78Id.
79To seal Nauru off from the American financial system.
80As stated by Vanuatu's finance minister. (See Hshikawa, "The Death of Tax Havens?" p. 415.)
81Id.
82E-commerce and high-tech industry are another option. The Netherlands Antilles, for instance, has approved a National Ordinance on Electronic Agreements to provide a legal framework for electronic transactions (see "Netherlands Antilles," Offshore Red, 2001, p. 187).
IV. Conclusion

After this short review of taxation in the Netherlands Antilles, one might ask whether the days of tax havens are numbered. But given the economic impact of suppressing tax havens in some poor economies like Nauru, can one not sympathize a little with those wishing for a long life to tax havens? A moderate solution must be proposed — it is only after balancing the costs and benefits of suppressing a particular attractive tax regime that a jurisdiction will be willing to adopt OECD-friendly measures. The Netherlands Antilles is one example of a country that has shown itself willing. Malta could be another. While a candidate for entry into the European Union, Malta probably recognized that it might be more profitable, in the long run, to belong to the European Union than to preserve tax and financial regimes objected to by the international financial community.

The long-term solution to the problem posed by those tiny countries for which tax regime change is unpalatable is to rethink their legal status. Is full sovereignty meaningful when economic independence is unavailable? The economies of those island states are so dependent on one or two larger nations that one can wonder whether those states should not be simply “annexed”; for instance, with Curacao becoming an integral part of either the Netherlands or Venezuela, with a special legal status maintaining its identity like the French overseas territories. Of course, the word “annex” is not used in its historical meaning in public international law; it just means that large nations have particular responsibilities to those states and that they should reconsider their relationship with them.

In any case, a balanced approach is necessary to ensure both an effective fight against harmful tax competition and respect for legitimate tax policies of sovereign nations and international legal obligations alike. That is one aspect of the passionate debate over the Netherlands Antilles in particular, and tax havens in general. Hopefully, this paper has revealed the storm initiated by the OECD over those “deserted” economies, through the example of the Netherlands Antilles. But, as is said by people in the Principality of Liechtenstein, isn’t it only where there are economic deserts that tax oases can exist at all?


89Malta,” Offshore Red, 1999, p. 7. Malta is now a member of the European Union.
90United Nations Charter, June 26, 1945, art. 2.1.
91”Steuerosen können nur existieren, wo es Steuerwüsten gibt,” (“tax oasis can only exist where there are deserts”) cited by Gross, “OECD Defensive Measures Against Harmful Tax Competition Legality Under WTO,” p. 400.